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Resumen
This paper explores the domestic price level and trade competitiveness of 
Hong Kong in addition to the compatibility of this dollar-based currency 
board to the criteria inspired by the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. 
On price and competitiveness, findings point out that during the turmoil 
Hong Kong had not performed as well as that in the past and an apparent 
reason for this is the inflows of hot capital from abroad especially of the 
US that fuelled rising property prices. On conformity to the OCA criteria, 
the findings broadly corroborate the fixed exchange regime with the US 
as the monetary anchor country but at the same time China appears as a 
prospective contender to US as the monetary anchor. In the longer run, 
amidst the prolonged economic and monetary weaknesses in the US plus 
the emergence of renminbi as a global currency, Hong Kong might as well 
unify its exchange rate with the Chinese money. 
Palabras clave: Asia, currency, Hong Kong, China, dollar, renminbi, 
money.
Clasificación JEL: F31, F32, F41, F42, O53.
Apuntes CENES Volumen 38, Número 67
enero - junio 2019.  Págs. 87-113
89
Abstract
Este documento explora el nivel de precios internos y la competitividad 
comercial de Hong Kong, además de la compatibilidad de esta caja de 
conversión basada en el dólar con los criterios inspirados en la teoría de 
la zona monetaria óptima (ZMO). En cuanto al precio y la competitividad, 
los hallazgos señalan que durante la agitación Hong Kong no se había 
desempeñado tan bien como en el pasado y una razón aparente de esto son 
las entradas de capital proveniente del extranjero, especialmente de los 
Estados Unidos, que impulsaron el alza de los precios de las propiedades. 
En conformidad con los criterios de la ZMO, los hallazgos corroboran 
ampliamente el régimen de cambio fijo con los Estados Unidos como país 
ancla monetaria, pero, al mismo tiempo, China aparece como un posible 
candidato a contendor de Estados Unidos como ancla monetaria. A más 
largo plazo, en medio de la prolongada debilidad económica y monetaria 
en los Estados unidos, más el surgimiento del renminbi como moneda glo-
bal, Hong Kong podría también unificar su tipo de cambio con el dinero 
chino. 
Keywords: Asia, moneda, Hong Kong, China, dólar, renminbi, dinero.
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Resumo
Este artigo explora o nível de preços domésticos e a competitividade co-
mercial de Hong Kong, além da compatibilidade desse quadro de moedas 
baseado no dólar com os critérios inspirados na teoria da área monetária 
ótima (OCA). No preço e na competitividade, as descobertas apontam que, 
durante a turbulência, Hong Kong não teve desempenho tão bom quanto 
no passado e uma razão aparente para isso é o influxo de capital quente 
do exterior, especialmente dos EUA, que alimentou o aumento dos preços 
dos imóveis. Em conformidade com os critérios da OCA, os resultados 
corroboram amplamente o regime de câmbio fixo com os EUA como o 
país âncora monetária, mas ao mesmo tempo a China aparece como um 
candidato em perspectiva aos EUA como âncora monetária. No longo pra-
zo, em meio às fraquezas econômicas e monetárias prolongadas nos EUA, 
além do surgimento do renminbi como moeda global, Hong Kong também 
poderia unificar sua taxa de câmbio com o dinheiro chinês.
Palavras-chave: Ásia; moeda; Hong Kong; China; dólar; renminbi; 
dinheiro.
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iNTRoDUCTioN
Today, world economies are still 
handicapped by the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis originated in the United 
States. In Hong Kong, recent pro-
democracy demonstrations in 2014 
have been regarded to have been 
driven by disgruntled middle class 
over rising property prices, stagnating 
wages, rising income inequality and 
crony capitalism, with massive portion 
of economic wealth concentrated in 
the hands of the elite group. Since the 
housing sector is largely linked to the 
riches, factors that fuel the skyrocketing 
housing market are essentially what 
drive rising income inequality. 
As the findings of this paper reveal, 
though the US dollar is still the most 
appropriate monetary anchor for 
Hong Kong, the US monetary stance 
has nonetheless brought tremendous 
inflationary pressures to asset and 
property prices in Hong Kong. The 
Chinese renminbi, as findings show, 
is a promising alternative to the US 
dollar, and thus, it could be a more 
stabilizing monetary anchor in the 
future. 
Historically, Hong Kong enjoys a 
track record of economic resiliency, 
as demonstrated during the 1997-
98 Asian financial crises (see e.g. 
Ran, Voon & Li, 2010). Many have 
attributed this to its dollar-linked 
regime which makes the HK dollar 
almost impossible for speculators to 
prey on. Nonetheless, as pointed out by 
Chen (2001), during most of the Asian 
crisis, the HK dollar was supported by 
its huge foreign exchange reserves, 
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not by its currency board. In the crisis 
period, billions of dollars flowed in 
and out of Hong Kong via electronic 
transfers without ever involving its 
currency board which was then based 
on notes and coins. 
Indeed, the rigid exchange regime 
could have actually made Hong Kong 
exceptionally vulnerable to shocks 
from abroad especially those from the 
US. As noted in Goodstadt (2010), 
during run-ups to financial crises, 
credit expansions and asset bubbles in 
the US would spill over to Hong Kong 
almost instantaneously. In this regard, 
housing wealth effects do explain a 
non-negligible part of the volatility of 
consumption, output, and employment 
in Hong Kong (Funke & Paetz, 2013).
The overheating would force local 
authorities to tighten lending and 
banking regulation, resulting in 
controls that distort legitimate market 
operations. Meantime, following an 
adverse shock such as the subprime 
crisis, tensions in the HK interbank 
markets would rise virtually 
concurrently with those in US (Fung 
& Yu, 2010). To make matters worse, 
defensive steps taken by domestic 
authorities were found to be impotent 
in reducing interest rate spreads and 
alleviating fears of counter-party 
risk. Against this backdrop, such 
complications can be more severe 
in the wake of the recent rudderless 
policies of the US Federal Reserve 
System, the money manager of the 
international dollar.
In the same vein, studies have not 
shown price stability benefits from 
subscribing to the US policies. For 
instance, Devereux (2003) found that, 
since the 1983 inception of currency 
board through the 1997-98 Asian crisis, 
Hong Kong had to endure significantly 
higher inflation than that in the US. 
The study also discovered that lack of 
real exchange rate adjustment might 
have played a role to greater variability 
in real GDP. Similarly, Imai (2010) 
concluded that the dollar peg has failed 
to deliver price stability —Hong Kong 
experienced high inflation of 7.4% 
over 1985-97 before the Asian episode 
and an extended deflation of -2.0% 
over 1998-2007 after the turmoil—. 
In light of the above, the following 
research questions can be posed. 
Firstly, how has Hong Kong fared 
in aspects such as price stability 
and trade competitiveness during 
the global crisis that originated in 
the US? Secondly, is the dollar-
anchored regime still as supported 
as before? This paper first explores 
the dimensions pertaining to price 
movement and trade competitiveness 
and then examines the level of 
conformity to the criteria related to 
the optimum currency area (OCA) 
theory. Given extensive linkages 
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between Hong Kong and China in 
trade, business cycle and inflation (see 
e.g. Gerlach-Kristen, 2009), China 
is used as a “control” to indicate the 
appropriateness of maintaining US 
as the monetary anchor country for 
Hong Kong. Throughout the analysis, 
data sampled are constrained by 
availability but generally ranged from 
2000 to 2010. 
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. The second section looks at the 
indicators pertaining to domestic price 
level and external competitiveness. 
The third section introduces the OCA 
theory and the criteria used. The 
fourth section examines the extents 
of conformity of Hong Kong to the 
respective criteria. Finally, fifth section 
discusses and concludes. 
ON PRICE MOVEMENT AND 
TRADE COMPETITIVENESS
In a nutshell, signs of the US subprime 
crisis had begun to emerge in early 
2007 but its real severity only began to 
manifest following the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
The consequences of the crisis have 
primarily taken the form of disruptions 
in domestic interbank lending and 
international Eurodollar markets. 
Uncertainty about losses incurred 
by banks and financial institutions 
increased their liquidity needs but 
at the same time they were reluctant 
to lend to each other due to fears of 
counterparty risk. 
Certain observers have blamed the 
falling US interest rates in the early 
2000s (see Figure 1 for money market 
rate) following the tech bubble crash 
and Sept 11 attacks as a predominant 
factor behind the crisis. In 2003 to mid-
2004, Fed funds rate had descended to 
only about 1%, believed to have fueled 
the mortgage bubble. The ensued 
tightening beginning in early 2005 is 
deemed too late as an effective tool to 
cool the overheated assets market. 
Interest Rate Experience 
How does the US interest rate compare 
with Hong Kong’s? Consistent with 
its fixed dollar rate arrangement, the 
Hong Kong money market rate has 
moved in tandem with the US one, with 
only little deviations between them, as 
shown in Figure 1. The deviations can 
be explained by market inefficiencies, 
transaction costs, and differentials in 
perceived risk premium. As for EA5 
(Emerging East Asian countries of 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Thailand), though the EA5 path 
also tracks the US one, because the 
EA5 countries do not rigidly peg their 
dollar rates, the EA5 average does not 
track the US rate as closely as the Hong 
Kong one does. 
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Figure 1. Money market rates, Hong Kong, US, and EA5 Average 2000:1-2011:9
Source: IFS 
Figure 2. Foreign exchange reserves (US$ bn), HK and EA5 Average, 2000Q1-2011Q2
Source: IFS 
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The immediate impact of Lehman’s 
collapse on Hong Kong’s interest rate 
can be seen from the sharp spike in Sept 
2008—a result of abrupt repatriation of 
dollars back to US following a credit 
crunch in the dollar markets (see e.g. 
McKinnon, 2010) which contracted 
short-term money supply in the 
Chinese territory. Correspondingly, in 
2008 there was a larger-than-usual net 
outflow of short-term financial capital, 
as portrayed in Figure 7.
Following that, the near-zero US 
short-term interbank rates since the 
end of 2008 and the subsequent 
“Quantitative Easing” for reducing 
long rates induced a flood of hot 
money into Hong Kong and other 
parts of East Asia, which posed greater 
growth potentials. The movement was 
driven by a combination of very low 
US interest rates and high expected 
returns in Hong Kong. 
Though its nominal dollar rate is 
fixed, Hong Kong is still susceptible 
to inflationary pressure from influx of 
short-term capital that, if transmitted to 
the export sector, could raise the Hong 
Kong dollar in real terms. Unlike other 
central banks, as a currency board 
operating in an international financial 
hub, the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authorities cannot impose capital 
controls on incoming funds.
Accumulation of Reserves and 
Inflationary Pressure
In light of the above, despite being 
a currency board (which should be 
passive in principle), the HKMA has 
intervened by raising holdings of 
foreign reserves to draw out excess 
liquidity from its financial system. 
Vividly, it was an attempt to curb 
domestic inflation and simultaneously 
restrain real appreciation of the Hong 
Kong dollar. 
This is made apparent by the exceptional 
growth of foreign exchange reserves 
during the global crisis in 2008-09, 
as revealed in Figure 2. The stock of 
reserves not only rose faster than in 
the earlier years but also more rapidly 
than the EA5 average after a temporal 
fall during the credit crunch in the 
Eurodollar market in the second half 
of 2008 that affected emerging Asian 
countries too. In fact, in a short period 
of 3 years of 2008-11, the US dollar 
value of Hong Kong’s foreign exchange 
reserves rose almost twofold —from 
$160 billion to $280 billion—. As for 
the EA5 countries which embrace more 
flexible exchange rates, their foreign 
reserves have not risen as rapidly as 
Hong Kong’s. 
Domestic monetary sterilization opera-
tions by HKMA are also indicated by 
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the sharp increase in base money1 in 
2008-09 as depicted in Figure 3 while 
at the same time, other components of 
money supply such as M22 and M3 
have risen more steadily. Nevertheless, 
despite these sterilization operations, 
M2 and M3 still increased more 
rapidly than nominal GDP and this 
seemed inflationary. 
In this regard, sharp build-up of foreign 
exchange reserves was too big to 
be fully offset by domestic monetary 
sterilization operations. The resulting loss 
of monetary control contributed to higher 
inflation (CPI) since 20073, to a level 
as high as the EA5 average, as shown 
in Figure 4. After the 2009 recession, 
prices in Hong Kong grew more quickly, 
surpassing the EA5’s in 2011. 
1	 In	Hong	Kong,	the	Monetary	Base	comprises	of	Certificate	of	Indebtedness	(which	exactly	back	the	banknotes	issued	by	
the	three	note-issuing	banks)	and	coins	in	circulation;	the	balances	of	the	clearing	accounts	of	banks	kept	with	the	HKMA	
(known	as	the	Aggregate	Balance);	and	Exchange	Fund	Bills	and	Notes,	which	are	 issued	by	the	HKMA	on	behalf	of	the	
Government.	These	assets	are	issued	by	HKMA	to	soak	up	excess	liquidity	in	the	market.	
2	 In	Hong	Kong,	M1	refers	to	the	sum	of	legal	tender	notes	and	coins	held	by	the	public	plus	customers'	demand	deposits	placed	
with	banks.	M2	is	M1	plus	customers'	savings	and	time	deposits	with	banks	plus	negotiable	certificates	of	deposit	(NCDs)	issued	
by	banks	held	outside	the	banking	sector.	M3	is	M2	plus	customers'	deposits	with	restricted	licence	banks	and	deposit-taking	
companies	plus	negotiable	certificates	of	deposit	(NCDs)	issued	by	these	institutions	held	outside	the	banking	sector.
3	 Though	obvious	rise	in	foreign	reserves	of	Hong	Kong	only	began	in	2008,	hot	capital	flows	could	have	started	to	pour	in	
since	as	early	as	2007	amidst	weaknesses	and	threats	of	bankruptcy	in	the	US	mortgage	markets.	And,	this	could	lead	to	
higher	inflation	in	Hong	Kong	since	2007.	Along	these	lines,	sterilization	operations	seem	to	have	been	implemented	after	
inflationary	pressure	had	begun.
Figure 3. Money supply and nominal GDP, Hong Kong, 2001Q4-2011Q2 (2001Q4=100)
Source: IFS 
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Figure 4. CPI inflation (%), Hong Kong and EA5 Average, 2000:1-2011:8 
Source: IFS
Figure 5. Price indexes for Hong Kong property market (1999=100), 1997:1-2011:7 
Source: Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong
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The most striking inflationary impulse 
can be seen in the property markets 
where prices rose steadily from the run-
up period to the subprime crisis, fell 
somewhat only in 2009 owing to the 
post-crisis recession, but continued to 
climb at an even faster rate right after. 
Specifically, the upward momentum in 
the property prices can be traced back 
to 2003, during period of very low 
interest rates in the US and Hong Kong 
(see Figure 1). Whilst nominal interest 
rates had been greater in 2005-2008, 
given greater rates of CPI inflation 
in Hong Kong (see Figure 4) real 
interest rates had actually not moved 
up as much. Therefore, the credit 
tightening in that period might have 
been insufficient to cool the property 
markets in Hong Kong.
On the above evidence, the fixed-
exchange-rate economy of Hong Kong 
does not appear to have enjoyed more 
stable prices or lower rates of inflation 
against the EA5 countries during the 
period of turbulence. 
ON COMPETITIVENESS
With respect to international 
competitiveness, the rise in domestic 
4	 As	noted	by	a	reviewer,	Singapore	and	HK	have	opted	for	a	focus	on	the	financial	sector,	gradually	abandoning	the	produc-
tion	of	goods,	and	from	this	point	of	view	the	appreciation	in	real	terms	is	stimulatory	for	this	new	specialization.
Figure 6. Real dollar rate as deflated by relative CPIs (2000:1=100), Hong Kong and 
EA5 Average, 2000:1-2011:8 
Source: IFS 
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Figure 7. Balance of payments (US$ bn), Hong Kong, 2000-2010 
Source: World Bank: WDI.
Figure 8. Balance of payments (US$ bn), China, 2000-2010 
Source: World Bank: WDI.
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prices has made foreign purchases 
from Hong Kong more expensive 
despite a stable nominal dollar rate. 
This is signified by a downward 
shift in the real dollar rate to a lower 
level (implying a real appreciation4) 
in mid-2008, as shown in Figure 
6. Nevertheless, saved by its fixed 
nominal exchange rate to the US 
dollar, real value of the HK dollar did 
not appreciate as high as the average 
of the EA5 counterparts. 
Figure 6 also shows that from 2000 
to mid-2008, the real value of HK 
dollar had actually been decreasing, 
due to its falling prices in relation to 
the US ones. This gradual increase 
in real depreciation of the HK dollar 
is compatible with its rising current 
account surplus till 2008, as portrayed 
in Figure 7. Whilst prices had already 
gone up in 2008, the year’s trade 
balance was yet to be affected by the 
price increase, probably due to lags 
and agreements set in previous prices. 
Figure 7 also reveals a slowdown in 
current account surpluses of Hong 
Kong in 2009 and 2010, amidst a 
sluggish global economy. During 
this period, exports from (imports to) 
Hong Kong had already been more 
expensive (cheaper), as reflected by 
the real appreciation of the HK dollar 
(Figure 6). 
Specifically, as regards external 
balance, Figure 9 shows the product 
and service trade balances of Hong 
Kong with US and with the world. 
From the chart, it is obvious that the 
rising current account surplus till 2008 
is largely due to rising trade surplus 
in services. This seems compatible 
with the international financial center 
status of Hong Kong and the booming 
housing and financial markets during 
the run-up period to the subprime 
crisis. Against the world, till 2008 
surpluses in service trade had in effect 
more than offset the deficits in product 
trade. The rising deficit in the product 
sector could have been a result of a 
shift of resources to the more profitable 
(financial) service sector during the 
boom. As for trade with US, a trade 
pattern similar to that with the world 
can be seen. 
Also notice that throughout the years, 
short-term capital outflows were 
virtually greater than its inflows, as 
indicated by the negative balances of 
short-term financial account. However, 
the reverse is true for 2009 in which 
net balance of short-term capital 
flows became positive, signifying 
greater inflows than outflows. This 
corroborates the exceptional growth in 
foreign exchange reserves discussed 
earlier. The capital balance returned 
to its usual pattern in 2010 when the 
panic subsided, as reflected by the 
slowed rates of growth in foreign 
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reserves and monetary base (shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively). 
Pertaining to reserve, a “negative” 
value actually indicates an addition to 
the reserve pool. This is clear when 
one examines the annual balance 
of payments of China in Figure 8 
which records consistent current 
account surpluses that were financed 
by accumulation of foreign reserves. 
In 2009-2010, short-term financial 
balances of China were also positive, 
signifying influx of hot money to China. 
All the evidence above appears to 
indicate massive inflows of “hot” 
capital into Hong Kong as a result of 
near-zero interest rates in US since 
the end of 2008. As interest rates in 
Hong Kong are parallel with those 
in US, with no expectations of Hong 
Kong dollar appreciating against the 
US dollar, it appears that these funds 
were not looking for higher yields but 
were aiming primarily at the booming 
property market, a sector highly 
sensitive to movements in interest 
rates. Hence, despite a slight dip in 
property prices in 2009 amidst the 
global recession, the housing prices 
have continued to rise through 2011, 
increasing even more rapidly than that 
preceding the recession (Figure 5).
Have the increased capital inflows been 
beneficial? One way of checking this is 
Figure 9. Trade balance with US and with World, EX-IM (US$ billion), 2000-2009 
Source: Trade Map: International Trade Center.
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by looking at the rates of unemployment 
in Figure 10. Firstly, over the years 
examined, unemployment rate in Hong 
Kong has always been higher than 
the EA4 average. Secondly, though 
unemployment rate had been declining 
during the run-up years to the subprime 
crisis, it stopped falling since the onset 
of the crisis, and even increased more 
rapidly than the EA4 one during the 
peak of the turmoil in 2008-09. On this 
finding, the increased capital inflows 
do not appear to provide employment 
gains to Hong Kong. 
Conformity to optimum Currency 
Area Criteria
The foundations of OCA theory 
were laid out by Mundell (1961) and 
McKinnon (1963), and then refined by 
Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1990). 
In essence, the OCA theory outlines 
the criteria under which a country 
or economic zone can reap large 
benefits and/or substantially reduce 
the cost of joining a currency area. As 
summarised by Boreiko (2003): 
The OCA theory concerns about 
certain benefits and costs associated 
Figure 10. Unemployment rate (%), Hong Kong and EA4 Average (excluding Indonesia), 2000Q1-2011Q1 
Source: IFS 
Note: Consistent data for Indonesia not available.
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with adopting a single currency 
which depend on the degree of 
convergence of the economies. The 
benefits are associated with econo-
mizing on exchange costs and im-
porting the credibility of the union’s 
central bank, thus reducing the 
inflationary expectations and level of 
inflation. As for the associated costs, 
they are essentially the opposite of 
the benefits of having an indepen-
dent monetary policy and exchange 
rate, which are useful as a means of 
coping with shocks that are asymme-
tric between the potential monetary 
union partners. (2003, p. 315)
Whilst the benefit of importing price 
stability from the US has been shown 
to be questionable in the preceding 
section, in this section we shall 
explore if Hong Kong’s dollar peg is 
still as appropriate as before, based 
on the prescriptions inspired by the 
OCA theory. Following Quah (2017, 
2016a, 2014b), and Quah and Crowley 
(2010, 2012a, 2012b), the OCA 
criteria investigated in this section are 
bilateral trade intensity, business cycle 
symmetry, inflation convergence, 
real interest rate synchronisation, 
and diversification in exports. These 
criteria were implemented by Artis 
and Zhang (2002) and interestingly the 
efficacy of the criteria was evidenced 
when Portugal, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain were selected as the group 
which possesses the least similar OCA 
features against Germany. This group 
of four member states is the most 
distressed euro area members today.
Except for the diversification variable, 
for all dimensions, the degree of 
conformity to the OCA theory depends 
on a reference country. Hence, aside 
from using US as the reference, 
as a “control”, China is used as an 
alternative reference. While the 
choice of US as the reference country 
is obvious, China is of course one 
possible reference country since Hong 
Kong has ever been closely tied to 
China politically and economically 
since its return to its motherland in 
1997. This is more so in the current 
landscape where China has begun 
to internationalize its currency 
by allowing more direct currency 
exchanges with renminbi and issuance 
of bonds denominated in yuan.
BILATERAL TRADE INTENSITY 
Mundell (1961) stresses the criterion 
of trade when evaluating the benefits 
of fixed exchange rates against the 
gains from exchange rate flexibility 
that could cushion shocks when wages 
and prices are rigid. In the same 
vein, McKinnon (1963) suggests that 
countries which trade a great deal with 
each other are good candidates for 
monetary integration as the benefits 
in terms of transaction cost savings 
and exchange rate certainty would be 
The Chinese Dollar Linked to the Hong Kong´s during the Global Crisis
Quah Chee Heong
104
greatly enhanced. In fact, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997) have detected that 
European countries which achieved 
the greatest levels of bilateral trade 
also experienced the greatest increase 
in readiness for monetary unification. 
Accordingly, it is obvious to use this 
facet as one criterion to check if US 
is still as appropriate as before as the 
monetary anchor country for Hong 
Kong. 
For this purpose, a bilateral trade 
intensity measure is adopted here. For 
Hong Kong i, trade openness with US 
(and China) is measured by bilateral 
trade intensity, (xi,r + mi,r ) / (xi + mi ) 
where xi and mi are the exports and 
imports of goods of the country and 
subscript r indicates destination to or 
source from US (and China).
Business Cycle Symmetry
It is clearly understood that when 
business cycles are substantially 
synchronised between two countries, 
the argument for flexible exchange 
rates to buffer asymmetric shocks 
becomes largely irrelevant. Hence, for 
Hong Kong the greater the business 
cycle synchronisation with either US 
or China, the stronger the argument for 
adopting the corresponding monetary 
policy. In terms of measurement, it 
has become popular to implement 
this OCA criterion according to 
synchronicity of business cycles by 
evaluating the cyclical component of 
output at business cycle frequencies. 
In this paper, the method of Gerlach 
(1988) and Baxter and Stockman 
(1989) is adopted where cyclical 
components of annual real GDP series 
are detrended using Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) filter. Since GDP indexes at 
2005 prices are used, detrended series 
are directly comparable. 
Inflation Convergence
According to Artis and Zhang 
(2002), the traditional OCA literature 
originated during the era of ‘fix-price’ 
economics; so introducing inflation 
convergence as one criterion could 
be regarded simply as an appropriate 
normalisation. From another perspective, 
since similar inflation rates can result 
from similarities in monetary and fiscal 
policy stances and economic structure, 
the cost of joining a currency area is 
presumably low when inflation rates 
are similar across members (Nguyen, 
2007). Besides, convergence in inflation 
also reflects similarity in the degree of 
trade union aggressiveness and labour 
costs between countries—implying 
lesser need for flexibility in nominal 
exchange rates in correcting current 
account imbalances (Fleming, 1971). 
This criterion is measured by absolute 
CPI inflation differential, |xi - xr| 
where xi and xr are the respective rates 
of inflation in Hong Kong and the 
reference country. Here, the absolute 
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value is used since the magnitude 
of the variable is of concern. 
Lower differentials indicate greater 
convergence in inflation and vice 
versa.
Real interest Rate Cycle 
Synchronization
Though not listed as one of the criteria 
based on the traditional OCA theory, 
this factor is indicated by a ‘revealed 
preference’ argument (Artis & Zhang, 
2002). If the monetary policy of a 
country historically has differed little 
from that of the reference country, 
the cost of relinquishing monetary 
independence is accordingly low, so 
that synchronisation in real interest 
rates may be interpreted as an 
indicator of coordination in monetary 
policy. In addition, real interest rate 
cycle synchronicity with a credible 
country could also imply willingness 
to commit to policies of high counter-
inflationary credibility (Tavlas, 1993). 
Following Artis and Zhang (2002), 
real interest rate series are detrended 
by applying the H-P filter, as in the 
business cycle synchronicity criterion. 
To ensure consistency, lending rate and 
CPI inflation rate are used to compute 
real interest rate.
Export Diversification
As put it by Kenen (1969), for a 
diversified economy, even if each of 
its export sectors might be subject 
to adverse shocks, if the shocks are 
substantially independent and the 
country produces a sufficiently large 
variety of goods, the law of large 
numbers will come into play and total 
production will not suffer much. Thus, 
it is easier to fix the currency value in 
a diversified economy than that of a 
specialised economy. 
Following Nguyen (2007), the degree 
of export diversification is measured 
by a diversification index, namely 
the inverse of the period average of 
the annual Herfindahl index which 
is a common indicator of degree of 
specialisation. The Herfindahl index is 
computed as H = Ʃni=1 Si2 
where Si is 
share of the export of product i, and n is 
the number of products exported. The 
higher the value of this diversification 
index, the more diversified the 
exports. Since data of individual 
export products are unavailable, 
annual export data according to the 
first-digit sub-industries of the United 
Nation Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) Revision 2 are 
used. The categories are displayed in 
Table 1. 
The Chinese Dollar Linked to the Hong Kong´s during the Global Crisis
Quah Chee Heong
106
Table 1. United Nation's Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2
Code Product type
0 Food and live animals.
1 Beverages and tobacco.
2 Crude minerals, inedible, except fuels.
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials.
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.
5 Chemicals and related products.
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material.
7 Machinery and transport equipment.
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles.
9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere.
Source: Nguyen (2007).
APPRAISING THE OCA 
FEATURES OF HONG KONG
The OCA view states that the greater 
the degree of trade with a country, 
the larger the benefits gained from 
exchange rate fixation. Figure 11 
charts the bilateral trade intensities 
(in percent) of Hong Kong with US 
and with China for 2000-2009. With 
respect to product trade, Hong Kong’s 
level of trade with China had not 
only been about four times as large 
as that with US but had also been 
rising steadily throughout the period. 
On the contrary, the degree of trade 
with US had been declining gradually. 
Similarly, for service trade with Hong 
Kong, China’s share is substantially 
larger than the US one. 
Besides the above, one can also observe 
that the relative importance of product 
and service trade is different for US 
and China. Vis-à-vis US, the extent 
of trade in service is greater whilst 
against China, product trade is more 
substantial. This seems consistent with 
the product-based economy of China 
and the service-based economy of US.
Secondly, with respect to business 
cycle symmetry, Figure 12 reveals 
that for 2000-2003, Hong Kong is 
relatively parallel with China but 
for 2004-2010, Hong Kong is more 
symmetrical with US. In this regard, 
it seems that Hong Kong was more 
convergent with US in the booming 
years leading to the subprime episode 
and the years thereafter. 
Incidentally, if we observe the 
movement of real exchange rate of 
Hong Kong against the EA5 average 
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Figure 11. Bilateral trade intensities with US and with China (%), Hong Kong, 
2000-2009 
Source: Trade Map: International Trade Center 
Figure 12. Business cycles of HK, US, and China, 2000-2010 
Source: IFS
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in Figure 6, it is apparent that when 
the real Hong Kong dollar is more 
expensive than the EA5 average, 
Hong Kong’s real income tends to 
fall (indicated by a downturn in the 
business cycle), and vice versa, when 
it is cheaper than the EA5 average, its 
real income tends to rise (represented 
by an upturn in the business cycle). 
This observation appears in line 
with the fact that East Asian growth 
is export-led and that economies in 
the region are competitors to each 
other internationally. Therefore, 
it is justifiable to include export 
diversification as one dimension to be 
examined here. 
Thirdly, on convergence of inflation, 
Figure 13 shows an increase in Hong 
Kong’s convergence with the US 
over the period but for 2011 there is 
an obvious divergence. Convergence 
with China has gone up too and been 
greater than with US as for the most 
parts of 2000-03, 2005-06, and 2011. 
Fourthly, real interest rate cycle 
synchronicity is represented by the 
charts in Figure 14. For each chart, 
the left axis represents deviations 
from trend (or cycles) of the real 
interest rate series whilst the right axis 
indicates absolute differences between 
the cycles. The left chart compares 
the HK and the China cycle whilst the 
Figure 13. CPI Inflation differentials with US and with China, 2000:1-2011:9 
Source: IFS
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Figure 14. Real lending rate cycles, Hong Kong, China, US, 2000:1-2011:9 
Source: IFS 
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right chart compares the HK and US 
cycle. From the charts, one can find 
that the HK cycle is more convergent 
with the US cycle. Also, though Hong 
Kong’s monetary policy is not directly 
linked to China’s, the HK cycle is also 
notably parallel with China’s. 
Lastly, let us look at the variable 
indicating flexibility of Hong Kong’s 
export sector to withstand shocks. 
Figure 15 signifies that Hong Kong’s 
extent of export diversification5 had 
been steadily falling over the 2001-
2010 period—decreasing faster in the 
first half of the decade and slower in 
the second half. This appears to be 
in line with the international trade 
theory popularized by Paul Krugman 
which suggests that a liberalized and 
open economy will over time be more 
specialized in its production, owing to 
economies of scale and accumulation 
of competitive advantage. Differently, 
as the figure also shows, the 
diversification level of Brunei, an 
oil-exporting economy in Southeast 
Asia with a currency board on the 
Singapore dollar, has remained stable 
throughout. 
5	 	A	reviewer	has	suggested	using	added	value	instead	of	gross	value	of	exports	in	measuring	export	diversity.	Nonetheless,	
gross	value	is	used	here	as	a	proxy	since	consistent	added	value	to	exports	data	are	not	publicly	available.	While	added	value	
may	be	more	precise,	gross	value	can	also	give	a	general	idea	in	terms	of	trend	over	time.	
Figure 15. Export diversification index, Hong Kong, Brunei, 2001-2010
Source: International Trade Center: Trade Map database.
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CONCLUSION
As the findings suggest, with an 
increasingly specialized economy of 
Hong Kong (indicated by diminishing 
export diversification), high domestic 
unemployment, and the outlook of 
sustained money expansions by the 
US, it would be more challenging 
for Hong Kong to maintain its fixed 
exchange regime without greater 
inflation and higher real exchange rate. 
On the OCA-based dimensions, the 
findings are mixed and the inferences 
can be different depending on which 
variable we look at. 
Despite this, in broad, the evidence 
appears to corroborate the fixed 
exchange regime of Hong Kong with 
the US as the monetary anchor country 
during the global crisis period but at 
the same time China does appear as a 
remarkably plausible contender to the 
US as the anchor country. 
So, how do the findings compare with 
the questions posed in the beginning 
of this paper? On price stability, it 
seems clear that during the global 
crisis period Hong Kong had not 
performed as well as that in the past. 
However, Hong Kong was as good as 
the EA average. On competitiveness, it 
had not been as good as in the past but 
had been better than the EA average. 
With respect to confirmation from 
the OCA-motivated facets, the rigid 
arrangement was still supported but in 
a declining manner. 
Though adopting the renminbi as the 
monetary anchor could be an option to 
the present arrangement, in the short 
run, this alternative seems to be a little 
far-fetched as the Chinese yuan has yet 
to be fully convertible on the capital 
account. Having said that, recently we 
can see efforts of internationalizing the 
yuan by the People’s Bank of China 
such as cross-border payments in 
yuan, direct currency swaps with close 
trading partners, and establishment of 
offshore market in Hong Kong where 
bonds denominated in renminbi are 
issued and traded. 
Along these lines, it seems promising 
that in the period of 10 to 15 years, as 
the Chinese economy and its share of 
world trade grow to become as large as 
the US’s, the Chinese currency would 
certainly be one of the internationally-
traded reserve currencies. At that 
moment, without having to confront 
political constraints as those plaguing 
the euro participants, it will be easier 
for Hong Kong to unify its currency 
with renminbi when the time is ripe 
economically. 
But then again, the findings and 
interpretations made here remain to 
be suggestive rather than conclusive. 
Admittedly, the approach used lacks 
the rigorousness from an econometric 
The Chinese Dollar Linked to the Hong Kong´s during the Global Crisis
Quah Chee Heong
112
perspective but it does provide a 
straightforward and persuasive 
elucidation on the subject. Future 
studies are encouraged to employ 
other available techniques to verify 
the findings and to explore other 
related facets such as political and 
social dimensions in light of recent 
discontents over rising costs of living 
in Hong Kong. 
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